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Transfers of water in the Crocodile River above and below the gorge (near Nelspruit 
and Malelane) were studied based on a survey in the area during November 2003, 
followed up by telephonic interviewing during March 2004. Almost all the water trades 
(permanent and rentals) observed in this study were from farmers above the gorge to 
farmers below the gorge. In order to study whether the water market promotes efficiency 
the data were subjected to several statistical analyses (Principal Components, Ridge 
Regression, Logit). It is concluded that in the transfer of water some attributes in the 
purchasing area such as lower production risk (sugar cane) and lower financial risk 
and better cash flow (bananas and sugar cane) were more important than the income 
per cubic meter of water. Water supply in this area is highly irregular while farmers 
were found to be extremely risk averse especially as far as down-side risk is concerned. 
The average water price in this area in recent years (2002 to 2003) was between 
R2,000 and R3,000 per ha (1ha = 8,000 cubic meter). Buyers are large progressive 
farmers that purchase (and rent) from many sellers (or lessees). It is concluded that 
information (sale prices and rents) is asymmetrical. Few permanent transfers have 
taken place in the Crocodile River in recent years. It is concluded that there are reasons 
why transfers at present are not processed and role players should discuss these 




In the study the performance of water markets in the Crocodile River in the 
Mpumalanga Province is studied as this river has had an active water market. 
While an active water sales (permanent) market has developed, water renting 
is common. The flow of the Crocodile River is highly irregular and the major 
dam in this river (Kwena) is presently (August, 2004) only used for residential 
and industrial use (Comrie, 2004). Risk management in water use must 
therefore be an important strategy in this area. The markets will be studied not 
only as they function today but also dynamic features will be researched by 
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comparing the present situation with a past study by Bate et al (1999) in the 
same river. Farmers at the time when the studies by Bate et al (1999) in the 
Crocodile River and by Armitage (1999) in the Lower Orange were undertaken 
were concerned about the application of the National Water Act (No 36 of 1998). 
The study links up with the WRC study on the supportive role of the market 
mechanism in implementing the provisions of the new Water Act (WRC, 
2004). This study is also complementary to a recent study in the Orange River 
(Gillitt et al, 2004). The research objective in this study is to study whether 
water marketing in the Crocodile River has promoted efficiency and whether 
efficiency objectives are realised that were envisaged in 1999 Bate et al study. 
Few permanent transfers have occurred in recent years and the constraints 
and problems in this water market will be researched. 
It would be instructive to revisit the same areas as in the Bate et al (1999) study 
and possibly the same farmers. A list of farms that have transacted water in the 
Crocodile (Mpumalanga Province) where Bate et al (1999) study was undertaken 
was obtained from the Regional Director at Nelspruit (Van Aswegen, 2004). 
2. BACKGROUND 
Efficiency implications of a water market will be studied in this paper using 
Principal Components, Ridge Regression (Neter et al, 1996) and Logit and 
Linear Probability Models. 
2.1  The National Water Act 36 of 1998 and lawful water use 
All water uses will eventually be authorised by way of licenses. As an interim 
measure the National Water Act (NWA) permits the continued use of water 
that actually has taken place when the NWA came into operation and was 
lawfully used under any law that preceded the NWA. Existing lawful use is 
defined in section 32 of the NWA and refers to use which had been taking 
place during a period of two years before the commencement of the NWA or 
which has been declared an existing lawful use under section 33 (Joubert, 
2004). An amendment to this allows for certain discontinued and 
contemplated uses that do not fall within the two-year period to be declared 
existing lawful use. The implication is that a user who has not exercised 
his/her water use entitlement in the qualifying period may apply for a 
verification of his/her water use as an existing use and if successful may 
transfer it (WRC, 2004). 
2.2 Theoretical  comments 




scarce resource. This issue is complicated as all the water applied is not used 
by the plant (consumptive use) since some may return to the stream as return 
flow. A water market may thus not promote water conservation as is envisaged 
if only the water that is applied is considered. Some contend that increased on-
farm efficiency such as water saving technology creates the illusion of water 
conservation when in reality consumptive use of water increases (Huffaker and 
Whittlesey, 1995; Nieuwoudt and Armitage, 2004). This is especially relevant in 
South Africa and Australia as water is measured based on diverted use (volume 
applied). This problem is greater in South Africa as farmers are permitted to 
irrigate larger areas if they use water conservation strategies such as drip. This 
issue will be studied in this paper. For recent literature on international water 
markets the reader is referred to the September 2004 edition of Water Resources, 
which included a special edition on water marketing. 
 
2.3  Past local research 
 
Water markets in the Western USA have a long history and date back to 1882 
(Howe, 1997). Water marketing in South Africa is relatively more recent. 
Several local researchers have strongly recommended the strengthening and 
support for these markets in South Africa (Backeberg, 1995; Conradie, 2002; 
Louw, 2001; Bate et al, 1999; Armitage, 1999, Mirrilees et al, 1994; Nieuwoudt, 
2000). As the present research is a follow-up on the research by Bate et al (1999) 
their findings will be referred to in this study.  
 
3.   SURVEY AREA AND NATURE OF WATER TRANSFERS 
 
3.1  Study area and characteristics of buyers and sellers 
 
The Inkomati Water Management Area is situated in the north-eastern part of 
South Africa in the Mpumalanga Province and borders on Mozambique and 
Swaziland. Topographically, the Great Escarpment (referred to as the gorge 
section of the river) divides this area into a western plateau and sub-tropical 
Lowveld in the east. Rainfall varies from 400mm to over 1200mm per year in 
the mountains (RSA, 2002). The study was undertaken amongst irrigation 
farmers along the Crocodile River above the gorge, and below the gorge 
towards Komatipoort during November 2003 with additional interviews 
conducted in March 2004. The climate in the study area varies from warm 
subtropical at Nelspruit, above the gorge, to hot subtropical downstream from 
the gorge. The area below the gorge falls within the Nkomazi/Onderberg 
region of Mpumalanga an area that has been thoroughly researched in recent 
times (Nowac, 1999). The most common crops below the gorge are sugar cane, 




produced. The target population was identified using documents supplied by 
the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF), which record the 
names of buyers and sellers of water entitlements from 1998 to 2003. The study 
was undertaken in the same area visited by Bate et al (1999) in order to study 
dynamic features of the market.  
 
3.2  Nature of water transfers  
 
In a water market it is expected that water will move from less desirable land 
to land where the return per unit of water (allowing for risk) is higher. It is 
thus essential to understand the climatic conditions in this area in order to 
draw conclusions regarding the desirable outcomes of transfers of water. 
 
All but one of the trades (permanent and rent) observed in the Lower Crocodile 
River occurred from farmers above the gorge to farmers below the gorge and all 
transfers were from up- to down-stream. The reasons for this phenomenon are 
explored in section 7. Only water that was not used was sold or rented out. 
 
Wolstenholme (2004) and Bower (2004) attribute the movement of water from 
above to below the gorge to better growing conditions below. All the 
information regarding growing conditions provided in this section is from 
Wolstenholme (2004). 
 
The soils above the gorge from Schagen down are sandy, which means that 
water, and minerals cannot be stored to any significant degree. Temperatures 
above the gorge are also not hot enough for the heat loving crops under 
irrigation (sugar cane, mangoes, grape fruit, Valencia’s and bananas) while on 
the other hand it is not cool enough for temperate crops that require coolness 
(pecans). The heat loving crops achieve greater yields below the gorge. Under 
good husbandry (irrigation and fertilization), orcharding is possible above the 
gorge but conditions are not as favourable as below (Wolstenholme, 2004). 
 
It is of interest why the major area under the gorge is under sugar cane as 
incomes from other crops are higher. Farmers see sugar cane as a lower risk 
crop than other crops, which partly explains the choice of the crop (Nowac, 
1999). Sugar cane has fewer pests, is reasonably drought resistant, has an 
established marketing and service structure that exists once a milling facility 
has been established, has faster cash flows and smaller fluctuations in market 
prices, and requires lower expertise and management inputs (Wolstenholme, 
2004; Bower, 2004; Conningarth Consultants, 1998).  
 




3.3  Characteristics of buyers and sellers 
A total of 18 farmers were interviewed, consisting of six buyers, nine sellers 
(six permanent and three temporary), and three that were neither buyers nor 
sellers. Although the number of farmers is small, some of these farmers 
entered into several contracts, for instance, one farmer leased from 12 lessors. 
The respondents were classified as either buyer or non-buyer for the analysis. 
Due to the low number of permanent transfers encountered, short-term leases 
of water were included in the analysis. Participants who had both purchased 
or sold, and leased water were only included once for the summary data. This 
classification resulted in six buyers and 12 non-buyers (6 permanent sales, 3 
temporary leases, and 3 non-participants).  
 
3.4  Crop production  
 
Table 1 summarises the land use of the respondents. The main crops produced 
by the buyers were sugar cane, bananas, and citrus while non-buyers 
produced more macadamia nuts, mangoes, and avocados. The large size of 
buyers compared with non-buyers is also evident in Table 1. 
 
Table  1: Crop production of respondents in the Crocodile River Basin, 
November 2003 and March 2004 









(ha)  9900 1256  862  37.2  61  40  0 
Number of 
Buyers  4 4 2 1 2 1 0 
Average Buyer 
Area (ha)  2475 314 431  37.2  30.5  40  0 
Std Dev (ha)  3715.7  134.22 295.57 NA  41.72 NA  NA 
Non-Buyer 
Area (ha)  55  0 102 132  70.6  50  48 
Number of 
Non-Buyers  2 0 4 6 4 1 2 
Average Non-
Buyer Area (ha)  27.5  0 25.5  22 17.65  50 24 
Std Dev (ha)  10.61  NA  19.67 16.91 21.68  NA  8.49 
Notes: 1) Macadamia and pecan nuts. 
2) Litchi, mango and avocado trees. 
 
The median area under sugar cane is 907.5 hectares. The median is a better 
indication of the situation because of the large area (8,000ha) of sugar cane 




of sugar cane, banana, and citrus, while non-buyers produce on relatively 
small parcels of land. This is probably due to the fact that most (5 of 6) buyers 
are located below the gorge. The buyer located above the gorge purchased 
more water entitlements so that he could sell a portion of his land. The buyers 
from below the gorge mostly used purchased water for crop production and 
one farmer used the purchased water for assurance of supply (security). The 
area below the gorge seems more suited to large scale farming enterprises, 
since there are more relatively flat areas, hotter climate, and better soils. The 
crop types grown by buyers and non-buyers are consistent with the earlier 
discussion of crops, given that most buyers were located below the gorge and 
most of the non-buyers were located above the gorge (11 of 12). Sellers of 
water did not cease production of crops in order to sell water but sold water 
that was not used for irrigation. The reason for having an unused water 
entitlement was that it was too costly to pump the water to the productive 
land. 
 
4.  PROBLEMS WITH WATER TRANSFERS IN THE CROCODILE 
RIVER 
 
Table 2 shows water market transactions that occurred in the Crocodile River 
from 1998 to 2003. The table was compiled from records received from the 
DWAF, which records all transfers of water allocations.  
 








Source:  C Ceronio, 2003. 
 
According to Table 2, the water market was active during the period 1998 to 
2000, which was also the case during 1994 to 1995 when Bate et al (1999) 
conducted their study. Few transactions have been approved from 2001 
onwards. Transfers of permanent water rights in the Crocodile River area have 
come to a standstill and some farmers say that the situation is chaotic as no 
applications are currently (2004) being processed. The only transfers that 
currently take place in the Crocodile River are rental agreements. The reasons 
for the lack of permanent transfers are explored in this section. 




The total land areas farmed and summary of water entitlements owned by 
respondents are presented in Table 3. Table 3 shows that buyers farm a larger 
area than non-buyers, but do not have enough permanent water entitlements 
for the area planted, and have to lease or purchase a large amount of water to 
irrigate their crops. There is also a wide range of sizes of buyers indicated by 
the mean and the median. Non-buyers tend to own an excess of water 
entitlements, which they might hold for times of drought, lease to other 
farmers, or sell to other farmers.  
 
Table  3: Area farmed and water entitlements before and after sampled 
transfers 
 Farmed  area  (ha) 
Surplus (Deficit) 
entitlements – after 
transaction (ha) 
Surplus (Deficit) 
entitlements – before 
transactions (ha) 
Total  12156 (592)  (1584) 
Mean  2 026  (99)  (264) 
Buyers 
(n=6) 
Median  809 (13) (89) 
Total  458 136 301 
Mean  38 11 25 
Non-Buyers 
(n=12) 
Median  40 1  19 
 
Table 3 indicates that buyers (situated below the gorge) had significantly 
exceeded their water use entitlements. These data include permanent water 
entitlements only, and temporary arrangements could lessen the excess. 
Farmers downstream from the gorge have rented and purchased in recent 
years to make up some of their deficit.  
 
The excess use of water without enough water rights as shown in Table 3 is 
particularly a problem below the gorge according to Deacon (2004) as in his 
view farmers simply expanded production even though they did not have 
entitlements to the water to support the expansion. He does not have a problem 
with farmers who irrigate a larger area than their allocation if they use drip 
irrigation as long as their volumetric entitlements are not exceeded. He 
contends that many farmers far exceed their volumetric entitlements and that 
this has put the system under stress. He, however, thinks that there is enough 
water in the system to justify current entitlements if every farmer only uses 
what he is entitled to. This view is somewhat different from that of Comrie 
(2004) who is of the opinion that demand exceeds supply in the system. 
 
Although Deacon (2004) has no problem with farmers who irrigate a larger 
area if they use drip irrigation, this practise reduces return flow and reduces 




drip and other advanced irrigation systems indicate that their usage is below 
the prescribed allocation of 13000 cubic meters per annum, which implies that 
they can irrigate a larger area. For example, a one-hectare entitlement 
(13000m3) could be used to irrigate 1.3 hectares if the irrigation method only 
uses 10,000 cubic meters per year.  
 
Joubert (2004) and Comrie (2004) see the problem as consumption exceeding 
availability. According to Joubert (2004) the problem is that in many cases 
there is no existing lawful use to transfer and the seller must first apply in 
terms of article 33 of the NWA for the use to be classified as an existing lawful 
use. Alternatively, the seller can apply for a license. The seller must have been 
an existing lawful user for at least two years before October 2002 (the legal 
application of the Act). 
 
Joubert (2004) considers that the following two reasons may explain the lack of 
approval of permanent transfers in the Lower Crocodile River: (1) Availability 
of water in the Crocodile River is a problem as the Crocodile River flow is 
irregular. The normal flow of the river must be considered while other 
commitments such as international obligations must be honoured. Transfers at 
present complicate the water scarcity problem as all sales have been from 
farmers who did not use the water for irrigation. (2) Farmers pay water tariffs 
for the area listed under irrigation (usually where the State built a dam). The 
irrigation area under such a dam is called a Government Water Scheme. Only 
a relative small part of the Crocodile River is a Government Water Scheme as 
other parts of the river (including tributaries such as the Lomati and Komati) 
are Government Water Control Areas. The latter mechanism is created to 
control the water use in areas where over-use is a problem. Farmers pay water 
rates under Government Water control Areas but less information is available 
on these areas. The payment of a water tariff is an aid to establish a lawful use 
but it does not make the use lawful automatically. Other regional problems are 
lack of qualified staff, which may explain delay in processing of applications, 
as the region must visited and volume of transfers verified. 
 
Joubert (2004) further states that a farmer may keep more water rights than 
what he actually uses in a particular year because he needs it as a security for 
drought. The point is that water must not be wasted and use must be 
beneficial. As licenses are not specifically described in the NWA he prefers to 
issue licences in terms of Chapter 4 of the NWA.  
 
Comrie (2004) at the regional office of DWAF in Nelspruit supports the view 
of Joubert (2004). Comrie (2004) states that demand exceeds availability during 




needs of the entire area (Government Water Scheme), which means that a 
large part of the catchment area falls outside DWAF direct control. All 
permanent water transfers must be verified and supported by the regional 
DWAF office at Nelspruit. Transfers of water from tributaries of the Crocodile 
River would be irresponsible, as this will aggravate the situation of water 
scarcity and the only route that Comrie (2004) sees is compulsory licensing. 
The reason why no transfers take place is because there is no unused water to 
transfer. In future one would expect that used water would be transferred. He 
concurs with Joubert (2004) that a farmer could retain surplus water for dry 
periods. 
 
5  ANALYSIS OF PRICES OF PERMANENT TRANSFERS AND 
RENTALS 
 
5.1  Price trends of permanent transfers 
 
Table 4 shows average trading prices of water from 1994 to 2003. Data for 1994 
and 1995 were obtained from Bate et al (1999), which also included two 
transactions in 1995 recorded during this study. The table shows both average 
price of the transactions, and average price of water weighted by area. The size 
of transactions (ha) and prices are defined in terms of area above the gorge, 
which allocates water at a rate of 8000 cubic meters per hectare per annum. 
Below the gorge the water allocation is 13000 cubic meters per hectare. The 
range, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation show that there has 
been a large variation in prices paid per hectare. It appears as if the coefficient 
of variation in prices has fallen over time, which will occur if information 
improves. 
 
Prices paid by each individual buyer also vary substantially. Two respondents 
purchased water from 12 and 9 different sellers. The average price received 
was R3,245 and R4,468. The standard deviation was R1,418 and R2,221 
respectively. Since there are few buyers and many sellers, it is likely that there 
is an asymmetrical distribution of information as buyers have better 
knowledge about availability and prices than sellers. The price is higher for 
larger transactions, which may indicate that the bigger the area offered by the 
seller, the more bargaining power the seller has and can thus negotiate a 
higher price. There is expected to be transaction costs involved during trading 
of water. The buyer may also pay a higher price per ha for a larger transaction 
than for many small transactions due to relatively fixed transactions costs. 
Some of these transaction costs include lawyer’s fees, DWAF administration 
fees, search costs, and the cost of time spent on setting up the trade 




Table 4:  Trading prices of water in the Crocodile River, 1995 to October 2003 















1994(3) 9  5.9  688 7164  4065 77.3 
1995(3) 10  14.6  848  5064  2446  45.1   
1996 1 141.4 6291  6291  6291  NA 
1997 5  59.2 2896  5430  3276  30.1   
1998 1  28.5 4064  4064  4064  NA 
1999 3  80.0 6310  7924  6922  13.0 
2000 10  505.5  2444  7520  5864 38.9 
2001 1  7.7 2312  2312  2312  NA 
2002(4) 5  230.6  2118 3138  2860 14.0 
2003(4) 1  27.0  2500 2500  2500  NA 
Notes:  1) Weighted average price: total price (R) divided by total area (ha). 
2) Standard  deviation  divided  by mean (Spiegel, 1961:73). 
3)  Data from Bate et al (1999) included for these years. Two transactions for 1995 are from the current 
study. 
4)  The number of transfers shown in Table 2 for 2002 and 2003 are lower than the number of transactions 
observed in Table 4 for these years. These transactions in Table 4 have not necessarily been processed 
by the DWAF; the actual contracts between farmers have, however, been drawn up and signed. 
All prices are expressed in real (2003) terms. 
 
5.2  Rental price, water tariff, opportunity cost, and rate of return 
 
Farmers enter into legal contracts for rental agreements usually for a period of 
one year although in one case the rent period was stated as at least 40 years. 
One large lessee rented from 12 lessors. The average lease paid for the 12 
contracts was R95.0 per hectare with a standard deviation of R21.3 per hectare. 
This is the price that the lessor receives for an entitlement of one hectare at 
8,000 cubic meters per annum4, which is a price of 1.188 cents per cubic meter. 
In addition to this, the lessee pays the tariff that applies to the entitlement. The 
water tariff at present (2004) is R104.88 per hectare per year or 0.777 cents per 
m3 below the gorge, and R68.40 per hectare per year or 0.855 cents per m3 
above the gorge. The following interesting economic conclusions can be 
derived from these data: (a) It is clear that the lessee has asymmetric 
information as rentals prices vary; (b) The opportunity cost of the water is 
1.965 cents per cubic meter (1.188 cents plus 0.777cents) for a water user below 
the gorge or R255.45 per year per ha (1ha=13,000 cubic meter of water). This is 
the gain that the market attributes to the scarce resource water at the margin; 
                                                 
4 The water allocation above the gorge is lower as rainfall is higher. As cubic meters of water 
are transferred, a buyer below the gorge needs to purchase 1.625 hectares of water entitlement 




and (c) With a water rental of R95.04 and a water price of R2,573.5 (average for 
2002 to 2003), the real rate of return on an investment in water is 3.7% (from 
this calculation water tariff is excluded as it is a cost to the lessor). This statistic 
may be on the low side as farmers may pay more for permanent transfers in 
this area as it gives them more security of future use. This statistic, however, 
questions real discount rates in water studies of often as high as 13 percent 
(Louw, 2001:204). 
 
6. STATISTICAL  ANALYSIS 
 
6.1 Principal  Component  Analysis of variables 
 
Variables associated with areas under irrigation by buyers and sellers were 
studied using Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The first two components 
are shown in Table 5. The variable name is given together with a description of 
what it measures and the loadings of the variable for each component.  
 





= 1 if participant is a buyer; 0 if non-buyer (Dependent 
variable) 
.740  .443 
CANE  Percentage of total crop planted to sugar cane  .806  .246 
BANANA  Percentage of total crop planted to banana  .320  .184 
CITRUS  Percentage of total crop planted to citrus  .188  .062 
NUT  Percentage of total crop planted to macadamia or pecan trees  -.747  .417 
VEGETBLE  Percentage of total crop planted to vegetable crops  -.046  -.682 
OTHTREE 




The difference between total water entitlements owned and 
irrigated area prior to market transactions 
-.647  -.206 
CROPDI  Index measuring degree of crop diversification  -.438  .690 
NPV 
Net present value of gross margin stream of crops per cubic 
meter of water used 
-.561  .743 
SIZE  Size of cropped area in hectares  .647  .321 
Eigenvalue 3.301  2.171 
Percentage of variance  30.010  19.734 
 
The first component shows that TYPE, CANE, and SIZE each have strong 
positive loadings. The NUT and SURPLUS variables have negative loadings. 
This indicates that observations that score a one for type (buyers) also score 
highly for CANE and SIZE, which means that buyers are likely to be large 




(macadamias and pecans). The PCA  also shows that buyers are large sugar 
cane producers. As discussed in section 4.2, sugar cane is an appealing crop to 
farmers because of the drought resistance, liquidity and marketing properties 
that sugar cane provides. In addition, due to the revealed risk averseness of 
the respondents, these properties of sugar cane are even more appealing 
because they serve to lower the risk faced from the farming operation by 
providing a stable source of income and allowing some production of more 
risky alternatives. The NPV variable has a relatively weak negative loading in 
this component. This indicates that farmers with a relatively high Net Present 
Value (NPV) from crop gross margins per cubic meter of water are more likely 
to be sellers of water entitlements. The NPV variable reflects future 
expectations of incomes, costs and a discount rate. 
 
It appears as if water moves to lower risk users and that some income may be 
sacrificed. This supports Bate et al (1999) conclusion. The remaining 
component does not indicate any further relationships with TYPE. The second 
component suggests that farmers who have a higher NPV are more 
specialized and produce less vegetables, with some evidence that they may 
produce more nuts (macadamia and/or pecan).  
 
6.2  Arrow-Pratt Absolute Risk Aversion 
 
Arrow-Pratt Absolute Risk Aversion (APARA) coefficients were calculated for 
five farmers. The elicitation of responses that were needed for calculation of 
these scores had to be done during personal interviews due to the nature of 
the questions. Of the seven farmers personally interviewed, one respondent 
was not the chief decision maker, and another farmer refused to answer the 
question. With this limited data, no comparisons between buyers and non-
buyers can be made. The median APARA coefficient for the five Crocodile 
River farmers measured 1.28, which was lower than the estimate of 2.44 for the 
Orange River Study (Gillitt et al, 2004). It is clear that irrigation farmers are risk 
averse, and when downside risk is measured, the farmers are more risk averse 
than anticipated in the questionnaire as almost all the farmers in the Crocodile 
study and in the Orange River study picked the most risk-averse category (an 
APARA coefficient of 3.28). Farmers would rather receive nothing (choice 1) 
than being given a 50 percent chance of winning R800,000 and 50 percent 
chance of loosing R200,000 (choice 2). A risk neutral person will be indifferent 
between choice 2 and receiving R300,000 with certainty. It is possible that only 
those who are risk averse have been able to survive in an uncertain environment.  
 
When faced with the chance that money could be won or lost, the farmers 




gain. They were not asked whether they would pay money to avoid taking the 
risk. The importance of these findings is that a great cost is attached to risk 
and whether weather induced or policy induced (insecurity of licenses) this 
risk will negatively affect investment in irrigation. 
 
7. REGRESSION  PROCEDURES 
 
Due to the dichotomous dependent variable, a Linear Probability Model 
(LPM) was used to estimate the relationship between explanatory variables 
and the dependent (TYPE) variable. Due to likely collinearity between the 
explanatory variables mentioned, ridge regression was employed in 
conjunction with the LPM. Once lease observations were included, the data 
consisted of eight buyers and 13 non-buyers. 
 
7.1  Linear Probability Model (LPM) of buyers versus non-buyers 
 
Although there are problems with this technique, it is applied as a first step in 
the analysis5. The variables in Table 5 were regressed against TYPE using 
ridge regression. The ridge trace indicated that regression coefficients stabilize 
after K=0.15 while the multiple regression coefficient declines by only one 
percent before this point. Table 6 shows the results of the ridge regression. All 
the variables except CANE were significant at the one percent level. The R 
squared value for the model is 76.5 percent and the adjusted R squared value 
is 70.6 percent. This indicates a very good fit for a LPM. For most practical 
purposes, the R squared ranges between 0.2 and 0.6 (Gujarati, 1995:546). The F 
value for the model is 13.00, which is significant at the 1 percent level, 
indicating that all the variables are jointly significantly different from zero. 
 
Table 6 shows that the most important variable distinguishing whether the 
farmer will be a buyer or non-buyer is BANANA. The SURPLUS variable 
shows that farmers who have a surplus of water entitlements prior to the 
transaction are likely to be non-buyers and farmers with no surplus or deficit 
are buyers. Buyers tend to farm a larger area (SIZE), and are likely to produce 
sugar cane (CANE). In short, buyers farm larger areas with relatively more 
banana and sugar cane crops and do not have a surplus of permanent water 
entitlements, and probably have a deficit. 
 
 
                                                 
5 The problems in estimation of LPM are non-normality of disturbances (the error term 
follows a binomial distribution), heteroscedastic variances of disturbances, and predicted Y 
values do not necessarily fall within the range of zero to one. In addition, the computed R2 




Table 6:  Ridge regression of LPM variables – buyers versus non-buyers 
Variable B  SE(B)  Standard Beta  B/SE(B) = t 
BANANA  0.923 0.199  0.490 4.643 
SURPLUS  -0.001 0.000 -0.337  -3.001 
SIZE  0.0001 0.000  0.290  2.380 
CANE  0.208 0.198  0.133 1.050 
Constant  0.108 0.073  0.000 1.480 
Note:  Dependent variable = TYPE. 
 
It is interesting that the coefficient for the NPV variable was not significantly 
different from zero. This measure is not collected from individual data due to 
the time-span of the survey and the volume of information required, but 
derived from the areas of crops produced by respondents, and projected 
incomes and costs for each crop from the NOWAC (1999) study and from the 
Macadamia Growers Association (2004). The model suggests that there is no 
significant difference in the NPV of gross margins per cubic meter of water 
between buyers and non-buyers. This finding implies that the market does not 
lead to a higher value use of water6. However, the market does allow farmers 
to transfer water entitlements in order to plant more crops that are more 
suited to their risk preference (sugar cane has lower income but less risk) thus 
allowing better management of risk.  
 
7.2  Logit model of buyers versus sellers 
 
A logit model using the variables from the ridge regression model fails due to 
a near perfect fit. The crop variables were used in the logit model to determine 
the crop production patterns of buyers and sellers. Since there is correlation 
between crops grown, these variables were combined using a PCA. Table 7 
shows the component loadings of the crop variables. 
The first crop PC has higher loadings for farmers that produce relatively more 
sugar cane and, to a lesser extent, citrus and lower loadings for farmers that 
produce relatively more macadamia and pecan nuts. The second crop PC 
scores highly for farmers with a higher proportion of banana, and a lower 
proportion of litchi, mango, and avocado trees. These crop PC’s were 
regressed on the dependent variable TYPE using a logit regression model. The 
                                                 
6 This finding should be considered cautiously due to problems in measuring the NPV of 
crops per cubic meter of water. Problems encountered were the different time horizons of 
crops, rainfall differences between areas, yield variation, differing costs of abstraction of water 
in different areas, and different irrigation systems. In order to collect the relevant data, 
individual information about areas and yield, cost and marketing data are required. This may 




Cox and Snell R-Square value is 40.6 and the Nagelkerke R-Square value is 
55.2 percent. The model chi-square value is 16.972 with two degrees of 
freedom, which is significant at the one percent level, and thus there is a 
significant relationship between the dependent variable and the set of 
independent variables. The Hosmer and Lemeshow (H-L) test chi-square 
value is 9.892, which yields a p value (significance) of 0.195. This tests the null 
hypothesis that the data were generated by the model fitted. If the H-L 
goodness-of-fit test statistic is greater than .05, the null hypothesis that there is 
no difference between the observed and model-predicted values of the 
dependent is not rejected, implying that the model's estimates fit the data at an 
acceptable level. This does not mean that the model necessarily explains much 
of the variance in the dependent, only that however much or little it does 
explain is significant. This indicates that the model fits the data moderately 
well, and the variation explained by the model is significant. 




CANE .758  -.004 
BANANA  .293  .670 
CITRUS .603  -.433 
NUT -.825  -.110 
VEGETBLE  -.243 .482 
OTHTREE  -.160  -.593 
 
The overall classification rate is 91.4 percent, with 95 percent of sellers and 86.7 
percent of buyers being correctly classified. The aim of this model is not 
prediction, so this information is only useful as an indication of fit of the 
model. Table 8 shows the results of the logit regression of these two crop PC’s 
on the dependent variable TYPE. 
 
Table 8:  Logit regression of buyers and non-buyers of water rights 




Wald  Degrees of 
Freedom 
Significance 
CROPPC1  1.640 .789  4.321  1  .038 
CROPPC2  1.433 .794  3.255  1  .071 
Constant  -.983 .731  1.808  1  .179 
Note:  Dependent variable = TYPE. 




CROPPC1 is significant at the one percent level, and CROPPC2 is significant at 
the 10 percent level. The beta coefficient for CROPPC1 is positive which indicates 
that farmers that produce relatively more sugar cane and banana, with relatively 
less macadamia and pecan nuts are likely to be buyers of water entitlements. The 
beta coefficient for CROPPC2 is also positive and shows that farmers with 
relatively more banana crop and less other tree crops (litchi, mango, and 
avocado) are also likely to be buyers of water entitlements in the market. This 
supports the findings of the ridge regression model shown in Table 5. 
 
8. CONCLUSION  COMMENTS 
 
The water market in the Crocodile River above and below the gorge in the 
Mpumalanga Province was studied based on a survey in the area during 
November 2003, which was followed up by telephonic interviewing during 
March 2004. Information was also obtained from various other role players 
(horticulturists, DWAF, legal experts and the Irrigation Board). The study was 
undertaken in the same area as the Bate et al (1999) study in order to observe 
dynamic changes in the market. 
 
Almost all the water trades (permanent and rentals) observed in this study were 
from farmers above the gorge to farmers below the gorge. Horticultural experts 
familiar with this area attribute this movement of water to the better growing 
conditions above the gorge. Temperatures above the gorge are not hot enough 
for the heat loving crops (sugar cane mangoes, grapefruit, Valencia’s and 
bananas) and not cool enough for temperate crops that require coolness. A 
major problem in citrus orchards above the gorge is the bacteria Citrus psylla 
causing greening in citrus. Crops that do well above the gorge are tobacco and 
macadamias (although White River appears more suited for Macadamias).  
 
The average water price in this area in recent years (2002 to 2003) was between 
R2,000 and R3,000 per ha (1ha = 8,000 cubic meter) with no clear trend in real 
prices of water during the period 1994 to 2003. It appears as if the coefficient of 
variation in prices has fallen which is attributed to better information about 
market prices in more recent years. The buyers are large progressive farmers that 
purchase (and rent) from many sellers (or lessees). Two respondents purchased 
water from 12 and 9 sellers while one farmer leased from 12 lessors. As the prices 
paid by a single buyer (or lessee) vary it is concluded that information is 
asymmetrical. Prices are higher for larger deals, which may indicate better 
information by larger sellers and probably lower transaction cost on larger deals. 
 
In order to study whether the water market promotes efficiency the data were 




Regression, Logit). It is concluded that in the transfer of water some attributes 
in the purchasing area such as lower production risk (sugar cane) and lower 
financial risk and better cash flow (bananas and sugar cane) were more 
important than the income per cubic meter of water. Water supply in this area 
is highly irregular while farmers were found to be extremely risk averse 
especially as far as down-side risk is concerned. The standardised 
Arrow/Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient for down-side risk was at least 
3.28. The latter number means that a respondent would rather receive nothing 
(choice 1) than being given a 50 percent chance of winning R800,000 and 50 
percent chance of loosing R200,000 (choice 2).  
 
Ridge Regression indicates that buyers of water are associated with deficit 
farmers, large farmers, and producers of sugar cane and bananas. Although this 
conclusion is self-evident it is interesting that the net present value of gross 
margin per cubic meter of water used (NPV) was not significant. In a Principal 
Component Analysis the NPV was mildly negative associated with buyers of 
water, which implies that buyers have a lower NPV than non-buyers. 
 
Almost no permanent transfers have taken place in the Crocodile River in 
recent years and the process has stalled. Some experts are of the opinion that 
due to the irregular flow of the Crocodile, the demand for water sometimes 
exceeds supply and that there is no water to transfer. Another expert is of the 
opinion that farmers below the gorge simply expanded production without 
having allocations to support it. His view is that water allocations are not 
greater than availability. Data collected show that buyers below the gorge 
indeed significantly exceeded their water entitlements and a main reason for 
buying and renting in water was to reduce this deficit. Only a relatively small 
part of the Crocodile River is a Government Water Scheme and the verification 
o f  e x i s t i n g  l a w f u l  u s e  o f  w a t e r  i s  more complicated according to DWAF 
officials. Other parts of the river fall under the (old) Government Water 
Control Areas (less is known about water use in these areas). It is concluded 
that there are reasons why transfers at present are not processed and role 
players should discuss these reasons and possible solutions before further 
action is taken. This situation is clearly sensitive and should be treated in such 
a manner. Allowing more trades from previously unused water in the wake of 
possible water scarcity may aggravate future shortages. The current 
concession that farmers may irrigate larger areas (30% more) if they use drip 
irrigation or other water conservation strategies reduces return flow and 
increases the consumptive use of water. This further aggravates the water 
shortage problem and it is recommended that the hydrological implications be 
studied.  
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